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Abstract  
In the last few years, the three major cities in Taiwan have been experimenting with two 
different demand-side management approaches to reduce the waste generated by households and 
to promote the recycling of recyclables. Thus, there are three different kinds of approaches of 
waste management that are concurrently used in Taiwan: fee-per-bag, mandatory recycling with 
free waste collection services, and the zero price of trash collection. We performed a comparative 
analysis of these policy instruments to take advantage of this important social experiment. We 
first developed an economic model for the three different waste charging programs concurrently 
in use and then performed an empirical study based on the implications from the theoretical 
analysis. It is clearly seen that the traditional approach of zero pricing of trash collection is very 
ineffective in terms of waste reduction and recycling. Households have all changed their behavior 
significantly in those cities with two new approaches. However, of the two, the fee-per-bag 





The cities and counties in Taiwan have long been charging households and businesses for 
the municipal services that they provide in relation to the collection of solid waste and 
landfill/incineration on the basis of each household’s and each business’s bi-monthly 
consumption of tap water since 1982. It is obvious that this scheme has been adopted simply 
because of practical administrative considerations.
1  However, this approach introduces two kinds 
of market failure. First, charging for trash collection and their disposal on the basis of water 
consumption is actually equivalent to pricing the services at zero. Second, since the charge is 
usually smaller than the costs associated with collecting the solid waste and landfill/incineration, 
this entails subsidizing the generation of waste and its disposal. These two market failures 
thereby induce households and small businesses to generate too much waste. The following 
figure clearly shows that the solid waste generated per person-day has increased exponentially up 
to 1997. Its growth rates have been kept in tandem with the growth rates of GDP per capita in this 
period.  
Alarmed by the rapid growth of trash generated in the last twenty years, in addition to the 
national recycling program administrated by the Environmental Protection Administration of the 
central government, the local governments of the three major cities in Taiwan have since 1999 
started to use different demand-side management approaches to curtail the growth of waste.
2 
Taichung, the third largest city, was the first to adopt a mandatory recycling approach on July 1, 
1999. The citizens of Taichung have been required to separate all household waste into four 
                                                 
1  Tap water companies in Taiwan collect water charges bimonthly according to the water consumption readings on 
water meters that are installed in every user’s premise including households.     
2  The 1988 amendment of the Waste Disposal Act adopted the Producer’s Responsibility Principle and stipulated 
that the manufacturers, importers and sellers of designated products should be liable for the collection and disposal of 
their post-consumption wastes, packages and containers. See Huang et al. (2003) for details of the national recycling 




categories, namely, recyclable, bulky, hazardous, and ordinary waste. Every evening, the city 
government dispatches hundreds of two-truck convoys along designated routes, one truck being 
only for ordinary solid waste, and the other specifically for recyclables. The trash collectors 
refuse to accept bags of waste containing any waste other than ordinary waste and will even fine 
violators from NT$1,200 to NT$4,500 at the same time.
3  The collection service is provided free 
of charge because the city government has already charged for the services of waste collection 
and disposal through the water consumption fee and for the recyclables through an advance 
disposal fee system.   
Taipei, by far the largest city, has implemented a fee-per-bag waste collection system since 
July 1, 2000. Households purchase special transparent plastic bags in six different sizes at 
convenience stores, at a price of NT$0.5 per liter of capacity. Total revenue based on this fee is 
supposed to be comparable to the revenue from the previous charge based on tap water 
consumption. As in Taichung, hundreds of two-truck convoys go to collect waste and recyclables 
together every evening. The trash collectors do not accept waste deposited in bags other than the 
special ones, while the collectors of recyclables accept recyclables free of charge. Since March 1, 
2001, however, the Taipei City Government has adopted a mandatory recycling regulation only 
requiring schools, multi-unit complexes and office buildings to separate recyclables from 
ordinary waste because the people in these places, without paying the charge themselves, have 
less incentive to reduce their quantity of waste through recycling. Finally, Kaohsiung, the second 
largest city on the island, has adopted a mandatory recycling approach that is similar to 
Taichung’s on January 1, 2001. However, all other local governments keep using the old 
approach to charge for the service of trash collection based on tap water consumption. It is 
actually equivalent to collect solid wastes at the price of zero. 
                                                 
3  The exchange rates between NT$ (New Taiwan dollar) and US$ have been kept between NT$32-35/US$ in the last 




Thus there are three different kinds of approaches to manage waste generation and recycling 
that are concurrently used in Taiwan. The two new approaches that have been used have had an 
immediate and significant effect on citizens’ behavior and have contributed substantially to the 
reduction of waste generated per person-day in recent years. Many earlier studies (Wertz, 1976; 
Jenkins, 1993; Miranda et al., 1994; Reschovsky and Stone, 1994; Strathman et al., 1995; 
Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996; Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1997; Nestor and Podolsky, 1998; 
Porter, 2002) have shown that the fee-per-bag approach has had significant incentives to reduce 
wastes generated and sometimes to dump trash illegally. However, there has never been a study 
that has shown the different effects of these three different approaches, including fee-per-bag, 
mandatory recycling with free waste collection services, and the zero price of trash collection, on 
citizens’ behavior. The purpose of this paper is thus to investigate whether the three approaches 
have significantly different effects on waste production and reduction, illegal dumping, and 
recycling. 
We first develop an economic model of household behavior under the three different 
approaches to charging for solid waste and derive the theoretical behavior in terms of waste 
production and reduction, illegal dumping, and recycling. We then conduct a survey of citizens in 
four major cities and counties in Taiwan, designing the questionnaires on the basis of the citizens’ 
theoretical behavior. The four cities and counties include the three major cities discussed above 
and Taipei country.
4 We empirically estimate the effects of the three approaches to charging for 
waste using the survey data. The empirical estimates are found to be consistent with the 
theoretical model’s predictions. Finally, we draw some useful policy implications and conclusions 
from the study. 
2. Theoretical Model 
                                                 
4  Taipei country acts as the baseline in the theoretical and empirical analysis because it still uses the traditional 




Let us assume, for simplicity, that there are J households living in a city. Each household’s 
preference is the same, and its utility function can be specified as  ( ) B c u   ,  where  c is 
consumption, 0 > c u , B is the total amount of waste illegally dumped by all the households in a 







,  0 < B u . bj is the amount of waste illegally dumped by household j. B is a 
typical public externality (Baumol and Oates, 1988). Each household generates m units of waste 
from its consumption of c, i.e. m= αc, where α is a parameter of the waste generation function 
and α<1. It is assumed that α is given.   
Each household has three choices regarding how to dispose of the waste generated: (1) legal 
dumping (g), (2) illegal dumping (b), and (3) recycling (r). Thus,   
r b g m + + =   and  ) )( / 1 ( r b g c + + = α  
It is also assumed that time is required for a household to dump waste illegally or to recycle 
it. The relationships are specified as follows:   
r i t r ) / 1 ( δ = ,  b i t b ) / 1 ( κ =  
where tb and tr are the time needed to dump waste illegally and to recycle it, respectively; 
3   , 2   , 1 = i , 4 represents Taipei City, Taipei country, Taichung and Kaohsiung, respectively. The 
time costs are different for different cities. These specifications assume that  0 ) / ( > b dt db , 
0 ) / (
2 2 < b dt b d ,  0 ) / ( > r dt dr ,  0 ) / (
2 2 < dr r d . 
  A household’s time and income constraints are as follows: 
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where  r b l w t t t t t   ,   ,   ,   , are, respectively, a household’s total time endowment, time for work, leisure, 
illegal dumping of waste, and recycling. A household earns income from non-wage income (a), 
wage income at wage w, and sells recyclables at price r p . Its income is assumed to be used to 




of g p , to pay a fine for illegal dumping ( b p ) if caught, to pay a fine (π F) for incomplete 
recycling, or to pay a fee for tap water and the municipal waste service based on water 
consumption ( w w Q p ) ( + µ ), where w p and Qw are, respectively, the household’s price and quantity 
of water consumption,
5 andµ is the unit fee for the waste service based on water consumption. 
π  is the probability of being fined for incomplete recycling in a city where recycling is 
mandatory. Let  ) / 1 ( r vi = π , i = 3, 4, and  i v be the enforcement resources. As for the fine for 
illegal dumping ( b p ), this is assumed to be a function of population density (Di) and enforcement 
resources (ei) in different cities with  0 / > ∂ ∂ i b D p   and  0 / > ∂ ∂ i b e p .   
The above model is a general one that covers the three different approaches to waste 
management used in different cities. The households in each city should face different income 
and time constraints.   
As usual, we derive first order conditions and conduct comparative static analyses for the 
three different approaches. Table 1 presents the first order conditions of the three models with 
respect to each of the three control variables, i.e., g, b and r. The household will make its decision 
as to how it will behave with respect to legal disposal, illegal dumping and recycling until these 
optimal conditions are met, that is, the marginal benefit from the behavior will equal its marginal 
cost. Column (1) shows that households in cities other than Taipei will usually equate their 
marginal benefit of consumption to its price. However, Taipei’s households will take the 
fee-per-bag of waste into account, too. When a household makes a decision about recycling, 
Column (2) shows that it will keep consuming until the marginal benefit equals the price 
associated with consumption plus the net cost of recycling. In cities with mandatory recycling, a 
possible fine for incomplete recycling is also included. Similar results can be found in Column (3) 
                                                 
5  Because water consumption is usually very inelastic with respect to its price and we are not concerned with water 




when the household tries to decide whether to dump illegally or not. 
From the first order conditions in Table 1, we can derive equilibrium conditions for different 
pairs of a household’s waste disposal choices as well as several interesting behavioral 
implications as shown in Table 2. First, households in cities with a fee-per-bag scheme may have 
a bigger incentive to dump illegally than others. Second, a mandatory recycling scheme with free 
waste collection services will reduce the incentive of households to dump illegally. Finally, 
households in cities with virtually free waste collection services will have the least incentive to 
engage in recycling. However, of the fee-per-bag and mandatory recycling schemes, which one 
will give rise to a bigger incentive to engage in recycling will depend on the relative magnitudes 
of those policy variables, i.e., marginal expected fine ( F v r i ) / 1 (
2 ) and fee-per-bag charge ( g p ). 
Thus, this question can only be answered by empirical studies.   
Table 3 is the result of comparative static analysis that depicts the impact of a change in each 
exogenous variable on the direction of the endogenous variables. All of the results are consistent 
with our intuition.   
3. Survey and Results 
The above theoretical model and its policy implications are examined by means of a 
household survey that asks respondents in Taiwan’s four major urban areas, including Taipei city, 
Taichung, Kaohsiung and Taipei county, questions about their waste-related behavior and 
socio-economic characteristics. Taipei county is chosen to represent the cities and counties that 
still use the traditional waste charging scheme in that the charge is based on water consumption 
and effectively gives rise to a zero price for waste collection and disposal. In early 2001, we 
conducted a successful household mail survey in the four areas. We obtained 893 observations, 
among them 327 in Taipei city, 303 in Taipei county, 105 in Taichung, and 158 in Kaohsiung.
6 
                                                 




The survey provided us with a rich set of data. Table 4 presents the definitions of variables 
that were obtained from the survey. 
We formulate two empirical models. The first model compares the effects of three different 
waste reduction programs on waste production and reduction, illegal dumping and recycling as in 
(1). Since there are three different approaches to charging, two dummy variables are required, 
namely, c pg D D , , to distinguish them. However, even though Taichung and Kaohsiung use similar 
approaches in that they both have mandatory recycling, there may be some location-specific 
differences between the two cities. Thus, the second model compares the effects in the four 
different urban areas as in (2). Three dummy variables are required to distinguish the four urban 
areas.  
1 4 3 2 1 0 ) ln( e Z X D D G c pg + + + + + = α α α α α  
2 4 3 2 1 0 e Z X D D RTIME c pg + + + + + = α α α α α  
      
      1 4 3 1 0 ) ln( e Z X Dummy G i i
i
+ + + + = ∑ α α α α  
2 4 3 1 0 e Z X Dummy RTIME i i
i
+ + + + = ∑ α α α α  
where  X is a vector of perception, attitude and behavioral variables. Z is a vector of the 
socio-economic characteristics of a household.   
Each model is a system of two equations. The first equation is a waste generation function 
that depicts the relationship between the amount of waste generated by a household each week 
and the policy variables and exogenous variables. The second equation is a recycling time 
function that relates the time spent each week by a household on recycling with the exogenous 
                                                                                                                                                              
households within the four urban areas and conduct the survey. The questionnaire was carefully designed by running 
one pre-test and holding one focus group discussion. All respondents in the focus group and the pretest were 







Table 5 presents the estimates of the two models.
7  As expected, Model 1 shows that the 
fee-per-bag scheme has significant effects on households’ behavior in relation to waste 
production and reduction, and recycling. The model also indicates that people’s environmental 
perceptions, attitudes and behavior including environmental knowledge (KNOWLEDGE), 
willingness to reduce waste (WTR), responsibility for the environment (RESP), intergenerational 
responsibility (GEN), out-of-home behavior (PRIN1), and at-home behavior (PRIN2)) are also 
significantly related to their waste reduction and recycling behavior. Of course, households with 
more members will generate more waste. They also need to spend more time engaging in 
recycling. However, the two income variables have no significant effects. This indicates that this 
kind of common environmental behavior is income inelastic.   
Model 2 clearly shows that the fee-per-bag approach employed only in Taipei City (dummy2) 
has significantly higher effects on people’s waste production and reduction, and recycling 
behavior. People’s environmental perceptions, attitudes and behavior, household size and income 
variables exhibit similarly significant effects in Model 2 as in Model 1.   
These regression results clearly indicate that the mandatory recycling program only 
significantly increases the time people spend on recycling. It, however, has no effect on waste 
production and reduction. On the other hand, the fee-per-bag program does have a significant 
effect on both waste production and reduction and the time taken to recycle.   
From the above regression results, we calculate the differences in the effects of these three 
different programs on waste disposed of and recycling time among the different urban areas as 
                                                 
7  In addition to the OLS regressions, we have tried to estimate the system of equations in the two models using the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE) method. However, the results of OLS and SURE are very close because the 





presented in Table 6. This calculation follows the method developed by Currie and Thomas (1995, 
1999).  
Once again, Table 6 shows that the fee-per-bag program is much more effective than the 
mandatory recycling program in making households recycle waste and hence in reducing waste, 
in that the households have to pay for the collection and disposal service. This is simply because 
the waste collection and disposal service is still free of charge for those households in the cities 
that implement the mandatory recycling program. Of the two cities that have adopted the 
mandatory recycling program, there are few noticeable differences. Such results have strong 
policy implications.   
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications   
In the last few years, the three major cities in Taiwan have been experimenting with different 
policy instruments to reduce the waste generated by households and to promote the recycling of 
recyclables. They have all had a strong impact on households’ behavior. We have performed a 
comparative analysis of these policy instruments to take advantage of this important social 
experiment. The results should have important policy implications.   
We first developed an economic model for the three different waste charging programs 
currently in use and then performed an empirical study based on the implications from the 
theoretical analysis.   
It is clearly seen that the traditional approach that is still used by most cities and counties in 
Taiwan is very ineffective in terms of waste reduction and recycling since, from the households’ 
point of view, it actually provides them with a waste collection service that is free of charge. In 
the three cities that are experimenting with two different approaches, households have all had to 
change their behavior significantly. However, of the two approaches, the fee-per-bag program is 
clearly the most effective approach because the fee not only creates incentives for households to 




Thus, city and county governments that still use the traditional charging approach should 
follow the three pioneer cities to adopt new approaches to encourage their citizens to reduce 
waste generated and to do more recycling. Among the two new approaches, the fee-per-bag 
program is more effective. Actually, the Environmental Protection Administration in the central 
government recently adopts a policy to provide local governments with expertise to implement 
the fee-per-bag program.   
Every person has different socioeconomic characteristics. Among them, we found that even 
though income, usually a strong factor in economic behavior, has no noticeably effects on waste 
reduction and recycling behavior, environmental perceptions, attitudes and behavior that are 
related to people’s intrinsic motivation toward environmental protection are important factors of 
waste reduction and recycling behavior. On other hand, we found that people including those 
with less intrinsic motivation toward environmental protection would behave more 
environment-friendly when external interventions such as the economic incentive program of 
fee-per-bag are introduced. Thus, the governments should adopt the fee-per-bag program, at the 
same time, keep on implementing those environmental advocacy and education programs that 
shall help people build up their knowledge, perceptions, attitudes and intrinsic motivation toward 
environmental protection.   
The survey-based empirical analysis is unable to provide supporting evidence for illegal 
dumping behavior that is predicted by the theoretical model. According to media sources and the 
Taipei City government, there are some (although not serious) cases of illegal dumping and the 
illegal production of the special trash bags. Most people behave. This may be due to the strong 
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Figure 1 Trends of GDP and Waste in Taiwan 
 
Sources:   1.  Taiwan Statistical Data Book, Council for Economic Planning and Development, 
       Republic  of  China.  
2. Yearbook of Environmental Protection Statistics, Taiwan Area, Republic of China, 




Table 1 First Order Conditions for Different Control Variables 
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Table 2    Equilibrium Conditions for a Household’s Waste Disposal Behavior 


























Equilibrium conditions between recycling (r) and illegal dumping (b) 
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Table  3  Comparative  Static  Analysis 




































µ   0  -  0  0  0 - 0 
i v   0 - 0 + 




pbi  0 + - 0 0  +  -  0 
i κ   0 + - 0 0  +  -  0 
not applicable 
i δ   0 ? 0 - 0 + 0 -  0  +  - 
W  0  + - - 0 + - -  0  +  - 
a   0  +  0 0 0 + 0 0  0  +  0 
pg  not applicable  -  -  +  +  not applicable 
 
 
Table  4   Definitions  of  Regression  Variables 
Variable  Definition 
Policy variable   
Dc  Dc=1 if mandatory recycling, 0 otherwise 
Dpg  Dpg=1 if fee-per-bag, 0 otherwise 
Economic variables   
Pg  fee-per-bag of waste, =NT$0.5 in Taipei, 0 otherwise 
Ln(m)  Log (monthly wage of the head of the household (NT$10,000s)) 
Ln(f)  Log (household’s annual income (NT$10,000s)) 
Perception variables   
ECL  the degree of cleanliness in the neighborhood according to the 
respondent’s perception, ECL= 1 if very clean, 5 if very dirty 
KNOWLEDGE  the respondent’s understanding of the recycling regulations, 
KNOWLEDGE=1 if very clear, 5 if very unclear 
Attitude variables     
WTR  The willingness to engage in waste reduction 
WTR=1 if very willing, 5 if very unwilling 
RESP  The extent of agreement with the question: “I myself am somewhat 
responsible for the bad environmental quality at present” 
RESP=1 if fully agree, 5 if fully disagree 
GEN  GEN =1 if the present generation has a higher priority over the next 
generation to use natural resources if the resources are limited, 2 
otherwise 
Behavioral variables   
G  amount of waste disposed of and collected by municipal services 
for a household (liters/week) 
RTIME  time spent recycling by a household (minutes/week) 
PRIN1  
PRIN2  
Two environmental behavioral variables produced using principal 
component analysis. PRIN1 represents environmentally friendly 
behavior not at home. PRIN2 represents environmentally friendly 
behavior at home. 
Household variable   
TPOP  Total number of persons usually living together in a household    
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Table  5   Parameter Estimates for Weekly Waste Disposed of and Recycling Time 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2 
Ln(g)  RTIME  Ln(g)  RTIME  Independent Variables 
Estimates  t-statistics  Estimates  t-statistics  Estimates  t-statistics  Estimates  t-statistics 
Constant 3.111  6.053***  18.983  1.291  3.115  6.063***  19.287  1.314 
Dc  0.033 0.570 5.116 3.003***         
Dpg  -0.365  -6.450***  9.954  6.132***      
ln(m)  0.064 1.473 -1.363  -1.091  0.062 1.428 -1.446  -1.158 
ln(f)  -0.037 0.038249  0.085  0.078  -0.036 -0.965 0.011  0.103 
KNOWLEDGE  0.061 1.791*  -1.932  -1.961*  0.061 1.775*  -1.948  -1.978** 
WTR  0.138400  2.717***  1.981 1.359 0.139 2.731***  2.015 1.385 
RESP  -0.061450 -2.120**  -0.162  -0.196  -0.061 -2.108**  -0.143 -0.173 
GEN  0.118168 2.462**  4.000  2.914*** 0.118  2.462**  3.993  2.912*** 
PRIN1 (environmentally 
friendly behavior not at home) 
-0.066838 -2.700*** 2.796  3.948***  -0.066  -2.670*** 2.833  4.004*** 
PRIN2 (environmentally 
friendly behavior at home) 
-0.070311 -2.993*** -0.470  -0.699  -0.066 -2.825***  -0.317 -0.468 
TPOP  0.136801 9.581*** 0.998  2.443**  0.137  9.619*** 1.023  2.505 
Dummy1 (Kaohsiung)      0.076  1.094  7.009  3.498*** 
Dummy2 (Taipei city)      -0.0364  -6.427***  10.003  6.165*** 
Dummy3 (Taichung)      -0.018  -0.232  2.795  1.247 
R-square  /  Adj  R-sq  0.2156 / 0.2050  0.0910 / 0.0787  02168 / 0.2052  0.0946    /    0.0812 
Notes: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level;    *** significant at 1% level.  
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Table 6    Differences in the Effects of these Three Different Programs on Waste 
Disposed of and Recycling Time 
  Ln(g)  RTIME 
By programs     
Fee-per-bag  -0.365***(0.056735)  9.954***(1.623295) 
Mandatory 




-0.399*** (0.0718853)  4.838**(2.0567855) 
By city or county     
Taipei city  -0.364***(0.056780)  10.003***(1.622559) 
Taichung  -0.018(0.078458)  2.795(2.242044) 
Kaohsiung  0.076(0.070124)  7.009***(2.003880) 
Difference     
(Taipei city – Taichung)  -0.346***(0.0880954)  7.207***(2.5183526) 
(Taipei city – Kaohsiung)  -0.441***(0.0809351)  2.993(2.3128401) 
(Taichung – Kaohsiung)  -0.094(0.0970396)  -4.214(2.7730451) 
Notes: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level;    *** significant at 1% level.    Standard deviations are 
in parentheses. Var(X-Y)=Var(X)+Var(Y)-2Cov(X,Y). 
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